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ELECTRONIC AIDS TO THE DRAFTING OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS*
by Reed Dickerson**
I would like to say thank you to the Bar Association for helping me
escape, even momentarily, from the turbulent atmosphere of the campus to the
relative quiet of mid-town Manhattan. Quite apart from this, it Is a high
privilege to talk to the members of this distinguished group.
Being a pedagogue, I am excused from saying anything practical, so let
me begin with some glittering abstractions. First of all, I commend you for
your perceptiveness in seeing the importance of good drafting and modern
technology in today's law practice. It is unusual even for a practicing
lawyer to see the true depth of the potential contribution that good draft-
ing can make to the substance of legal instruments, and it takes more than a
little courage to confront the awesome paraphernalia of today's computer
technology. You score high on both counts.
I am particularly heartened by your interest in drafting because, If
the bar were to take a strong Interest in good draftsmanship, the law schools
might find a stronger incentive to do something about It. Ironically, at
Indiana University, where we are even experimenting with a far-out course in
Jurimetrics, we have no current course in legal drafting, and yet legal
drafting Is something that most lawyers do, or try to do, every day of their
professional careers. Because the process Is only imperfectly understood,
it has been easy for the law schools to steer around the difficult problems
of pedagogy by characterizing legal drafting as a mere "skill," which is the
term that legal pedagogues condescendingly use to refer to the more pedes-
trian routines of law practice that they prefer to entrust to the stewards
of continuing legal education.
Having voiced my personal frustrations and prejudices, let me now turn
to the matter at hand, which is how to press a few buttons and get, almost
instantaneously, a perfectly conceived, drafted, and printed will, lease or
contract.
For a long time now, I have been hearing people claim that they are
drafting legal Instruments by machine. Unless you consider xeroxing an
existing will legal drafting, do not believe them. The simple fact Is that
you cannot draft by computer in any but a peripheral sense. At the same time,
there are particular points during the over-all drafting process at which a
computer or other device may be a significant help.
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If drafting can be said to begin with research, technological systems
are now available for handling the routine aspects of searching both statutes
and case law. Although a fairly high level of achievement has been reached
in the electronic searching of statutes, only modest success has been achieved
so far in the electronic searching of case law. Even so, the electronic
searching of law is now solidly operational from a technical standpoint. The
same general techniques are available for searching bodies of factual infor-
mation. I understand, however, that this is not the main thing we are talking
about tonight.
The second point at which electronic or mechanical devices can be use-
ful in drafting Is that of retrieving boilerplate provisions covering the
generally recurring situations involved in the problem at hand.
-There have been writers on legal drafting who would have you believe
that It Is an abdication of professional responsibility to use a form book.
Certainly, there are dangers in the use of forms, even the forms that you
develop in the course of your own practice. Blind adherence to precedent
will certainly get you into trouble, and the danger is not significantly re-
duced by the use of electronic or mechanical devices for retrieving and re-
producing forms. At most, they save time and reduce the chances of typo-
graphical error.
There are at least several ways to store and retrieve legal forms. They
may be in a book. They may be manually filed by subject matter In conven-
tional folders. They may be filed serially and retrieved by use of an index,
which may be created manually or by a computer.
Under the more sophisticated systems now available, office forms can be
stored on magnetic or paper tape, from which they can be disgorged at speeds
up to 200 words a minute. Clauses can be arranged in any sequence. The ma-
chine can be stopped at any point for the insertion of materials custom tai-
lored to the needs of the client. The equipment now available for such
operations Includes IBM's Magnetic Tape Selectric Typewriter ("MTST"), the
DURA 1041, the Edltyper 200, and Friden's 2340 Flexowriter.
The best boilerplate is not obtained at the bookseller's but is hammered
out by the lawyer himself after a succession of attempts. It Is done by
preserving drafts that deal with recurrent problems and by improving those
drafts, usually on a piecemeal basis, as the occasion suggests. Boilerplate
need not and should not remain frozen while significant improvement is pos-
sible. A provision may have to go through many generations of change before
it matures into a reliable, top-grade module of prefabricated law.
One of the dangers in mechanizing the process of storing and retrieving
boilerplate is that the draftsman may be distracted by the allurements of
hardware and scientific system. No computer can compensate for basic inade-
quacies in the drafting process. I know of at least one non-profit enter-
prise that Is engaged in providing state codes in which a high percentage of
the specific provisions have been standardized but whose structure and form
violate every known principle of draftsmanship. If these codifiers persist
in their current ways, they not only will betray the general principles of
codification, which offers a better-than-normal opportunity for sound legal
architecture and expression, but will also discredit the legitimate uses of
electronic devices for enhancing the professional operations of lawyers.
Bollerplate deserves conscientious attention to accuracy and detail simply
because as boilerplate it is marked for a high incidence of use. One of the
codiflers' main errors in strategy has been to put off perfecting their com-
position until they have perfected their computer techniques. It is next to
impossible to move from Inadequacy to near-perfection in a single step.
The danger in talking of drafting problems in terms of equipment Is
that the underlying problems are often broader than the broad range of de-
vices, electronic and otherwise, that are available to solve them. For this
reason, it may be more fruitful to think in terms of s stem than to think In
terms of equipment, because many useful systems require [ittle or no equip-
ment. The tit e of tonight's discussion might well have been, Electronic
and Other Aids to the Production of Legal Documents.
A good example of non-mechanized system lies in the very field we have
been talking about - the storage and retrieval of legal boilerplate. An al-
ternative approach to the problem Is illustrated by an automobile insurance
policy that I have here. At least one insurance company issues a combination
automobile policy consisting of nine designated coverages and a long list of
standardized conditions and exclusions. As printed, the basic policy applies
to no named insured and to no specified automobile. Nor is there any place
on the policy where these items can be entered. Instead, these are entered
on a short strip of paper called an "extension certificate." This contains
all the information that is peculiar to that policy: policy number; effective
date; expiration date; name and address of Insured; year, make and number of
automobile; the specific coverages and their respective premiums; and the
countersignature of the issuing officer.
The generating legal force is the extension certificate rather than the
longer document containing the legal boilerplate. For example, if the ex-
tension certificate carries the notations "A 7," "B I," and "I," it means
that the specific coverages so designated in the basic policy are incorpor-
ated by reference and made a part of the extension certificate. In this
example, it means that the insured has $50,000-$1,000,000 of bodily injury
liability coverage, $5,000 of property damage liability coverage, and towing
and labor costs coverage on the terms specified in the basic policy. I have
been told that some New York banks have used this device in preparing trust
instruments, but I have no direct confirmation.
This alternative, which requires no electronic or mechanical support,
requires a highly mature and fairly stable instrument. It has the advantage
of assuring standardization among specific applications where that is impor-
tant, and it offers the convenience of making later standardized and simul-
taneous changes in the family of instruments served by the particular boiler-
plate instrument.
It also poses special problems. What frequency of use makes it practi-
cable to create and include particular boilerplate? Some provisions will be
used in every instance. Some will be used in a majority of instances. Some
may be used in a substantial number of instances but not a majority. Here,
the user must weigh the advantages of standardization and uniformity against
the disadvantages of superfluity. It also requires a terminology broad
enough to cover all anticipatable variations in applicability ("the product
being priced"). These problems are described In more detail In my book,
Legislative Drafting (1954), particularly I Chapter 5, "The Fundamentals
of Legal Drafting."
Another point at which the computer might be useful in preparing a
legal Instrument Is In testing Its logical structure and measuring Its Impact
on documents that It Is intended to supplement, change, or replace. The
system that I am about to describe Is, so far as I know, a potentiality, not
an actuality. For this reason, I will describe it in the sparest language
that I can command. I can do this best In terms of a statute, for which It
Is more likely to be helpful. Even so, it could be helpful also for highly
complicated private Instruments.
Recent developments in the field of symbolic logic and electronics sug-
gest the possibility of using these disciplines to test the internal coher-
ence of statutes and to determine the extent to which a proposed statute,
would be inconsistent with current statutory law.
One development has been the conception, If not birth, of a "logic
machine." The capabilities of the propositional calculus for solving log-
ical problems is well established. Experiments in the field of military
strategy, for example, have already suggested the feasibility of using the
propositional calculus to test the internal logical coherence of military
texts. The same approach could make it possible to test the internal log-
ical coherence of an existing or a proposed statute. The only new elements
are (I) the possibility of translating the relatively crude language of legal
instruments into the unambiguous and consistent language of formal logic,
and (2) the possibility of mechanizing the process of logical testing.
The possibility of a logic machine Is based on the fact that the logic
of classes (Boolean algebra) and the propositional calculus involve the use
of expressions that can be digitalized by the assignment of binary numbers,
which in turn permit the use of electronic devices. The use of binary num-
bers is possible because in these disciplines all materials can be trans-
lated into statements that are either true or false.
This would also make it possible to determine which provisions of an
existing statute would need to be amended to give effect to a proposed stat-
ute. Under such an approach, statements of law needing amendment would ap-
pear as statements with which the proposed statements of law were inconsis-
tent. Inconsistencies could be brought to light by forming the logical prod-
uct of the numbers representing the statements respectively involved. Both
the underlying logical process and the mechanized version of it are capable
not only of detecting the existence of a logical inconsistency, but of ascer-
taining the specific provisions of existing law that created the inconsis-
tency. The latter would be the provisions that needed to be amended or
repealed.
Similar problems could also arise for very complicated private instru-
ments. Indeed, I understand that Edmund Berkeley used Boolean algebra in
the late 30's to improve the substantive coverage of insurance policies.
Anything that can be handled by Boolean algebra can be computerized, where
that Is considered desirable.
Computers are useful not only for lightening the burden of deadening
routine, but for making calculations that It would be extremely onerous or
impossible to do manually. Ordinarily, calculations of this magnitude are
not Involved in the preparation of legal Instruments. In the field of estate
planning, however, it is often desirable, among other things, to be able to
estimate the probable tax consequences of various alternatives. Accordingly,
the computer is beginning to be used in estate planning. As far as I know,
there are now two commercial enterprises operating In this field.
One is the Amerad Corporation, of Charlottesville, Virginia, which has
developed a computerized program for figuring for a given situation the
estate and inheritance taxes that it is reasonable to anticipate. So far as
that information affects the testator's judgment, this can be an aid to
estate planning.
A more sophisticated system has been developed by Carl G. Paffendorf of
COAP Systems, Incorporated, in Greenvale, Long Island. As stated In his
words,
The manual analysis of estates Is not only a time
consuming process, but also presents an abundance of
opportunities for mistakes. Arithmetic errors and data
transposition oversights frequently distort the data re-
lied upon in making major decisions. Many calculations
require a fair knowledge of algebra, and more than a
fair share of patience. An example is the complicated
formula required to calculate taxes when the surviving
spouse's Inheritance (and, there, the marital deduction)
falls below one-half the adjusted gross estate owing to
the apportionment of death taxes. Lawyers who have made
this calculation will appreciate the value of having it
done automatically; the computer can make the calculation
without error for whichever allocation and apportionment
rule is required.
Other pitfalls and problems which arise in the
manual analysis of an estate Include questions such as:
Will debts be borne by the beneficiary or the estate?
What part of the taxes and probate costs will have to be
borne by each beneficiary? What part of jointly held
property should be included In the estate of each joint
owner? What amount Is includible in the donor's estate
when a gift in contemplation of death is inherited back
upon the prior death of the donee? How should one handle
income in respect of a decedent? Should this type of
income be included in a marital gift?
Another advantage In using a computer lies in its
capacity to organize data into meaningful categories,
one of the first steps of estate analysis. The system
with which I am most familiar organizes the client's
estate and administers it through two hypothetical pro-
bates: the first assumes he dies before his spouse, the
second assumes that his death follows that of his spouse.
The preadministration of the spouse's estate is also done
twice. This approach uncovers many latent problems and
opportunities, and provides the attorney with a basis for
comparing the relative value of his proposals.
Information calculated by the computer for each of
the four hypothetical probates includes:
(I) Expenses, debts, and state and federal taxes;
(2) Optlmized marital deduction data;
(3) Liquidity needs and funds available to satisfy
these needs;
(4) Post-mortem income;
(5) Apportionment or allocation of taxes;
(6) Net inheritances to various beneficiaries; and
(7) Surviving spouses' elective shares.
Other points are analyzed when appropriate, e.g., the
applicability of IRC Sections 303 (stock redemptions) and
6166 (extension of time to pay estate taxes); the taxation
of partnerships and corporations which have elected to be
taxed as partners under Subchapter S; and the effect of
deaths within a prescribed period of time.a
During the stage of composition, automatic typewriter complexes of the
kinds already described are useful in providing continuously collated results,
where the changes being made at any particular state are not so extensive that
they decimate the text of the preceding version. Thus, text can be carried on
magnetic or paper tape in such a way that, after specific changes are made in
it, the remainder may also be reproduced automatically, but without the risk
of new errors. This makes it necessary to proofread only the changes.
This system has been used with some success in several states during the
legislative process. As soon as the text of a bill that is being considered
is changed at any point, the corresponding change is made, via keyboard termi-
nals, on the magnetic tape. The collated result is available on almost instan-
taneous call. The normal period for engrossment is thus reduced almost to zero.
This particular system is called the "Administrative Terminal System."
Associated equipment is available for both magnetic tape and paper tape
that on a second typing justifies both left and right margins. This provides
a typographically more impressive result. Equipment is also available that
a. Paffendorf, Estate Planning Aids, in Com ters and the Law 70, 75
(R. Bigelow ed., 2 ed. 1969, copyright A.B.A. 196, 1969).
will enable the tape to drive a typesetting machine (e.g., GPO's "Linotron"
system) that produces, for example, a fully printed will. In some instances,
the completed will has been printed by this method on a continuous paper
scroll, assuring a result that would be hard to tamper with.
Finally, electronic equipment such as that used in the Administrative
Terminal System permits wide, immediate dissemination. Although probably of
little use for the majority of private instruments, it promises to be useful
for legislation. For example, once the Governor has signed the enrolled bill,
it has been possible to reproduce it simultaneously at 40 outlets dispersed
throughout the state. This goes far towards solving the more serious problems
of disseminating new laws.
If this is a fair summary of how computers and other devices can be used
in drafting legal instruments, it must be clear that the uses of the computer
for this purpose are only incidental. However, the fact that the central as-
pects of the drafting process necessarily remain with the draftsman does not
deny the usefulness of technological aids along the way. The main danger here
is that the draftsman may become beguiled by technology to the point where he
makes the economically bad judgment of using devices more elaborate, than the
problem at hand calls for, or where he abdicates his responsibility to supply
the essential professional judgments in which he has been trained and which he
Is being paid to provide.
Let me conclude by making some general observations on the use of system,
whether automated or not. The greatest value of system in the law is not that
it saves time and money, but rather, that it provides an enormous resource in
substantive feedback. This is a point that I have been at some pains to ex-
plain in my book, and I see it verified every day. The rigorous pursuit of
consistency in idea, form, and style; the adherence to generally accepted
usage; and a careful attention to structural design or architecture are bound
to lay bare for the draftsman to see all sorts of opportunities for substan-
tive improvement. This is the basis of Professor Layman E. Allen's "language
normalization" program at the University of Michigan.
How best to exploit this opportunity is a problem. I suggest here that
we should not over-emphasize the importance of getting the facts and grasping
the minutiae of the client's policy goals before starting to compose. Pro-
fessor Seavey surely overstated the opposite approach when he said that he
wrote his articles first and researched them afterwards, but he had a solid
point. The draftsman who tries to have his detailed ideas completely in hand
before starting to write is making a serious tactical error; he overlooks the
needed substantive feedback that only an attempt to formulate tentative con-
clusions provides. Besides, why research matters that a more mature consid-
eration may show to be irrelevant?
The discipline of decision theory, games theory, symbolic logic, and
elementary mathematics, which represent systems rather than technology, may
also turn out to offer advantages as valuable to the practicing lawyer as
what the computer may ultimately provide.
Let us keep our minds open to the possibilities here. Let us make the
law more truly interdisciplinary and perhaps we may all become not only better
draftsmen but better lawyers in the service of society.
